FUGITIVE
SLAVE CASE
DISTRICT
COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
FOR
THE
SOUTHERN
DIVISION OF
RUEL
DAGGS, VS. ELIHU FRAZIER, ET ALS.
Trespass
On The Case
___________________________
Reported
by George Frazee
A Member
of the Bar
_______________________
???? – In
justice to himself, the reporter ___________here ____ that the
original notes of the case were taken solely for private use, but, respect the
solicitation of the counsel ____________, as well as others, he has consented to
_______ publication.
Printed
by Morgan & M’Kenny
1850
FUGITIVE
SLAVE CASE
Ruel Daggs vs. Elihu Frazier, et als
___________________
Reported
by George Frazee
A Member
of the Bar
Printed
By Morgan & M’Kenny
1850
FUGITIVE
SLAVE
CASE
District Court of the
Southern Division of
RUEL DAGGS, plaintiff, vs. ELIHU FRAZIER, et als, defendants. Trespass on the Case.
D. Rober, Esq., Counsel for plaintiff. J.C. Hall and J.T. Morton, Esqs., for
defendants.
This was an action of
trespass on the case, instituted in September, 1848, by Ruel Daggs, of
The declaration contained
six counts. The first two allege
that the slaves were rescued from the plaintiff or his agents. The third and fourth, that they were
harbored and concealed, so that they afterwards escaped from and were entirely
lost to the plaintiff; and the fifth and sixth, that the plaintiff was hindered
and prevented from recovering his slaves by the acts of defendants; and the
amount of damages claimed was $10,000.
Plea, Not Guilty.
The suit had been continued
from term to term, for cause shown, and at this term, after a motion by
defendants counsel to exclude all the plaintiff’s depositions for irregularity,
had been sustained by the Court, plaintiff filed his affidavit, and moved the
Court for a continuance. The motion
was opposed by Mr. Hall, and after argument, was overruled.
Plaintiff then entered a
nolle prosequi as to several
of the defendants and immediately subpoenaed them at witnesses to supply as far
as it was possible the want of evidence occasioned by the exclusion of his
depositions.
A jury was then impannelled, and sworn, the declaration read, and the
witnesses for plaintiff introduced.
The following is the substance and very nearly the language
of
THE
EVIDENCE.
GEORGE DAGGS sworn. Direct examination, by Mr. Rorer.---Is the son of the plaintiff, Ruel Daggs, who has resided in
Judge Dyer here observed in reply to the inquiry of counsel, that the
court would take judicial notice of the Constitution of Missouri, and the existence of Slavery in that
State.
Cross
examination
by Mr. Hall. Was sent for by
plaintiff in the early part of June, 1848, and told that the negroes had run away. They were all absent when I arrived, and
I immediately went in search of them.
Live some fifteen miles distant, and had not visited them for about a
month previous. Did not see the
negroes escape, and was not
there at the time. Is the owner of
salves.
Slaves are sometimes sold at the south as well as at home. Were worth the sums
mentioned, at home, at private sale.
Direct,
resumed. It is thinly
settled in the neighborhood of the plaintiff’s residence.
Question (Objected to by Hall). What was the common report in the
neighborhood with regard to the slaves?
Per Curiam. Mere rumor cannot be given
in evidence as to the escape.
Rorer, for plaintiff, gave
notice that he should contend that the possession in
Examination resumed. Was not at the plaintiff’s
when the women and children were returned.
ALBERT
BUTTON sworn. In June, 1848, resided in
Cross examination. Went to the house as
attorney. Nelson Gibbs was the Justice. Claimants said they had no legal
authority to act---were in a bad scrape and would back out. Street acted as counsel for the negroes. Was there about thirty
minutes. Do not know if they
were to take a warrant or not to retain the negroes.
Direct
resumed.
JONATHAN PICKERING
sworn. Reside about one and a half miles from
SAMUEL SLAUGHTER sworn. Saw
Wm. Daggs, the son of Ruel
Daggs, on Saturday, and was requested to assist him
and McClure in finding some slaves he was looking for. He said they had been traced to the
Cross examined. Reside two and a half miles from
Direct
resumed. Gave up the matter because I did not wish to embroil myself and was
tired of the business.
ALBERT BUTTON
RECALLED BY Rorer. Knows Clarkson Frazier.
Thinks his name is Thomas C. Frazier. Never saw him write it.
JONATHAN PICKERING
RECALLED. Knows but one Clarkson Frazier. Writes his name Thomas Clarkson Frazier
and is one of the defendants.
HORACE B. HUNTING sworn. Was in
Cross examined. Understood there were slaves about that
some one wanted to take to
Plaintiff’s counsel here asked time of the Court to procure another
witness. Defendants counsel
objected, and it was refused, whereupon plaintiff announced that he had no
further evidence to offer.
Mr. Hall prayed a nonsuit as to a number of the
defendants. Rorer opposed the
motion on the ground that the jury alone had a right to decide upon the
evidence. It was finally agreed by
counsel that if a non-suit were entered as to any of defendants during the
trial, plaintiff might use them at witnesses.
Mr. HENDERSON was then sworn on the part of the defendants and examined
by Mr. Hall. Was present in
Cross examined. I did say there was no
opposition.
Direct
resumed. Slaughter said
in the meeting house that he could not show any written
authority.
J.B. ROSE sworn. Resides in
Cross examined. Saw the negro go out.
Saw him go to the horse. Gilcherson
unhitched him, put the reins over his head, and lifted up the child. Was not near enough to hear what was
said.
Mr. DORLAND, sworn. Was in the meeting house at the
time---was at the stone house. The
crowd passed my school house and went to the stone house. Were from fifty to one
hundred persons there, and a good deal of confusion. A great deal of sympathy expressed,
principally by the women present.
Got upon a pile of boards, called the attention of the crowd, and
proposed that they should go before a Justice, and if the negroes were proved to be slaves
their claimants should be permitted to take them. The proposition appeared to be
agreed to by all. Went to Gibbs’ and thence to the
Anti-Slavery meeting house. Button and Street were there. Claimants were
required to
show
their authority. Said they couldn't show any such authority as was demanded.
Gibbs said the negroes were
free so far as he knew. T.C.
Clarkson was there. Heard no objection to trial by the
claimant. Should say there
were two parties there. Moses Brackett said the negroes should not be taken off without a trial. Saw
no violence and heard no-threats. Saw neither of the agents afterwards. They at
first claimed to be agents. One was asked if he had any written authority from
Daggs. No authority was given beyond their
assertion.
Cross
examined.
Some authority was required more than their assertion. No one was sworn. They
were merely asked to prove their agency. On the condition required, one of them
said no one there was agent. Saw negro go out of the house. One of the Fraziers was at the stone house. Saw John Pickering at the
meeting house. Have been directed by no one as to what evidence I was to
give.
FRANCIS
FRAZIER, sworn.
Lived south of
Cross
examined.
Can't tell what book they had, nor whether a law book or not. proof was required that claimants were authorized to take the
negroes. Heard nothing of any
writing. Don't recollect what kind of proof was required. Something was
said about the existence of slavery in
off. Saw
LEWIS
TAYLOR sworn.
Was at the trial in the meeting house. First saw the negroes one-fourth mile from
Was
at the meeting house.
Button, Street, Slaughter and the negroes were there. Heard no
evidence before the Justice. Didn’t see the negroes go out. Heard nothing of a
warrant.
Cross
examined.
Several persons were with the blacks when I first
saw
them, and Johnson was one of them.
F.A. McELROY
sworn. Resides in
Cross examined. I told some women to open the way
and allow the old gentleman to pass.
Females were much excited.
Stood out from the crowd when I heard
Brown. His exclamation was
“I will shoot that d__d son of a b___h.” He had
a pistol drawn half way out of his pocket.
DORLAND recalled by defendants.
The conversation in the meeting house was between Gibbs, Street and
Button, and the agents. After
calling for the proof and the production of the book, one of the three said the
negroes might be detained
until evidence was produced. Can’t
say which one it was.
Cross examined. Heard one of them say they had come
for a fair trial and they should have it.
Slaughter was required to produce other proof than his
own assertion. The book
looked very much like the
JONATHAN FRAZIER sworn. Was overtaken by
Slaughter in the wagon. Two
men,
Cross examined. It was on Sunday morning. No one besides the two men was with
me. No negroes had been in the wagon. Was about two miles from
Some discussion here occurred between counsel as to the propriety of the
next question asked by Mr. Rorer, at the conclusion of which it was ruled out by
the Court, and the defendants stated that they had concluded their
evidence.
Mr. Rorer then opened the argument on the part of the plaintiff, and was
followed by Mr. Morton for the defendants. Together, they occupied the whole of the
afternoon. No notes of these two
speeches were taken at the time, and in consequence, no attempt will be made to
report them. The concluding
argument on the part of the defendants was then made by Mr. Hall, in very nearly
the following language:
SPEECH OF MR. HALL
JURORS--
this suit and this trial possess an interest which has rarely occurred in the
judicial history of our young State.
It is truly novel---the first suit of the kind ever brought west of our
mighty river.
The Court, too, is novel. It
is not a Court that derives its powers from this State, but the United States;
and the subject matter sued for---the right demanded by the plaintiff---the
wrong complained against the defendants, is based alone upon an act of Congress
and the Constitution of the United States.
The Federal Constitution has recognized the institution of Slavery, and
provided for the return of persons held to labor when they shall escape from the
State where they are so held, to another State. The Act of Congress has made it penal in
any person to hinder or prevent the owner, his agent or attorney, in arresting
such fugitives, or to rescue them from the owner, his agent or attorney, or to
conceal and harbor such fugitives.
This act of congress almost assumes the character of an international
law. It is a rule of action between
two States. Although the State of
This being the case,
In deciding this question you should be careful to let no prejudice
induce you to step aside from the ordinary rules of evidence. It is one of the requirements of law,
that every material fact upon which a plaintiff bases
his right, shall be proved before that right is
established.
In this case the plaintiff must establish by evidence, and you, Jurors,
must find,
1st. That the plaintiff
resided in the State of
2nd.
That those negroes, being his slaves,
escaped, and, without his consent, came to the state of
3rd. That the
plaintiff, by himself, his agents or attorneys, pursued said slaves into the
State of
4th. That the defendants, having notice that said negroes were slaves and fugitives from labor, hindered and
prevented the plaintiff, his agents or attorneys, from arresting said slaves; or
that they harbored and concealed said slaves from said plaintiff, his agents or
attorneys; or that they rescued said slaves from said plaintiff, his agents or
attorneys, after they had captured them.
A review of the evidence given in this case, will, I think, satisfy you
that these facts have not been proved. Indeed, it has rarely been my fortune to
argue a case where there was such a barrenness of evidence and where a verdict
was claimed based so much upon prejudice---where every rule of evidence is
subverted, and every law of presumption prostrated. You, gentlemen, are called upon to
sacrifice the defendants to the excitement of the day---to the feelings of the
public---to the Moloch of Faction.
It is enough that the defendants are accused. This
Let us examine the questions which the law requires the plaintiff to
prove, and the evidence by which he claims he has made that
proof,
1st. That the plaintiff
must reside in
2nd.
That these slaves escaped from his custody, without his consent,
and came to
This, I say, is not proved.
The only witness to this point
is the plaintiff’s son. He swears
that he resides in
But did the plaintiff own these slaves, and did they escape clandestinely
and without his consent, and can he bring no other witness who could establish
the fact? Is this his best
evidence? Was there no other person
who had seen them after the first of May?
This cannot be. If the
plaintiff really lost his slaves, some one knows more than this witness. Why is he withheld. Let
the rule that the plaintiff has urged against the defendants apply to himself. He has
not produced the best evidence. He
has produced almost none at all.
They were there—they were not there---guess where they are and how they
came to go. Credulity must have
strong pinions to bear up in such an atmosphere. The rules of evidence, the rules of law,
are trampled upon---on the ordinary grounds of street veracity, no one ever yet
descended so low as to hazard his reputation for truth upon facts thus
supported. In the ordinary
transactions of every-day life, no one would act upon such a tale. You must have something
more.
Then the first main fact is not proved. Daggs, the
plaintiff, lost no slaves. If they
were absent, the presumption is, like that of a horse,
that the owner consented to their absence.
I now come to the third question.
Did the plaintiff by himself, his agent or attorney, pursue said slaves
into the State of
Mr. Slaughter acted at the instance of William Daggs. The
court ruled from your consideration every word, act, and motion of William Daggs. Your
ears are shut as to him. He has not
been produced as a witness. His
conversation cannot be received and has not be
admitted. Then there is no agency;
nothing proved---not a syllable, a sign, or a motion, upon which a power can be
inferred authorizing any one to pursue the slaves.
Now, if these slaves were not pursued by the plaintiff, his agents or
attorneys, there could be no rescue---there could be no hindering and preventing
the plaintiff in recapturing them---there could be no harboring and concealing,
unless the plaintiff was inquiring, seeking, or desiring their return. To conceal---to harbor! The Act of Congress contemplates that
the act done shall produce some effect upon the acts of the party losing the
slaves, which may delay, hinder, or prevent his recovering them; but if he does
not seek them, if he does not
inquire, if he does not follow, how can he be hindered in that which he does
not attempt? How can he be delayed
in that which he never begun? How
can an act prejudice him, when he has never exerted that action which alone
could receive the prejudice?
The first act that Daggs ever did was to bring
this suit, and he has scarcely followed this up with a scintilla of
evidence. He seeks in the signs of
the time—in the darkened political atmosphere---in a deep feeling of excitement,
at this moment lashed into boisterous commotion, to recover from the defendants
for the loss of slaves which he never spent a passing inquiry about when they
had gone, if, indeed, he ever lost any.
The fourth question is, Did the defendants, after having notice that said
negroes were slaves, do any
of the acts forbidden to be done by the Act of Congress? It is true that about
What did the defendants do that hindered or prevented the arrest of these
supposed fugitives from labor?
There is not a syllable of evidence to show that any one of these
defendants ever moved a finger, said a word, or, in the remotest manner,
interfered, up to the time the arrest was made. That these acts must precede the arrest,
I think, cannot be doubted. If the
defendants interposed no obstacle to the search and capture, it can hardly be
asserted that they hindered or prevented a capture.
Did the defendants rescue the
fugitives after they were
captured?---The evidence shows that they were seized
about half a mile from the road.
When they were brought to the road, the defendants, Thomas and Elihu Frazier, came up to where they were. Both of them insisted
that they should be taken before a Justice of the Peace, and identified, and the
power of McClure and Slaughter shown. One of the Fraziers said that he was willing that they should take them
if they made the proof; the other said they should not take them even if they
did make the requisite proof.
This conversation induced Slaughter and McClure to take the negroes before a Justice of the
Peace, and they proceed to
If these acts constituted a rescue, then there was one made. But if it requires some overt act, some
demonstration of physical power, some menacing threat, some force, actual or
implied, some stratagem that operates as a fraud, then the requisites of a rescue are wanting. So far as anything can be seen, or has
been produced in evidence, it was a voluntary and righteous abandonment on the
part of Slaughter and McClure. They
had no authority to act---they had no power to hold. They abandoned, and they so declared
themselves.
If what was done constituted a rescue, when did the act of rescue begin,
and when end? Who did the act, and
what was then done?-- The voice of accusation will never
trouble herself with detail in her charges, if she can escape through the
miserable apology which is desired in this case. The Fraziers
insisted upon the power, and that the blacks were slaves. The declaration filed by the plaintiff
concedes and avers that they were proceeding to prove the slaves, and alleges a
rescue where they were during this effort at investigation. The evidence does not open the lips of
the Fraziers after they arrived in town. It does not even show that defendant,
Way, ever saw the negroes.
They do not prove that Comer was in town that day or had any knowledge
that there had been an arrest. They
do not prove that John Pickering said a word, except as the negro passed where he was, when he
said something to him, like others, but what it was no one heard. As to William Johnson, we have shown
that it was Henry, not William---that William was not
only not present, but that he favored the Missourians. The balance charged,
stand free from all evidence, unless you adopt the advice of the
plaintiff’s counsel and make residence at
But did the defendants harbor and conceal the negroes?
They certainly did not rescue; they did not hinder and prevent their
arrest.---What is the evidence upon this point? It is proved that on Sunday before these
blacks were arrested, a report was in circulation that negroes had escaped from Missouri, and John Pickering said
that he had let Eli Jessup have his horses to drive a light carriage to
Farmington, as Jessup informed him, to take a preacher; that the horses were to
have been returned on Thursday or Friday previous; that they had not been
returned at that time; and in place of having been used to draw a light
carriage, they had hauled a large
wagon, and that they had returned under circumstances, that if the report should
turn out true which he had heard, might bring suspicion upon him, which, he
said, would be false. He complained
of the manner in which he had been treated in regard to his
horses.
John Comer, when the subject was up in conversation, bitterly denied any
knowledge or hand in the matter, but said that the negroes were not in Henry county, and ‘sniggered in
his sleeve.” Slaughter testifies
that about seven miles before he got to
This, gentlemen, embraces all of the evidence. Did any of the defendants harbor or
conceal these negroes after
notice that they were fugitives from labor, and, if so, was it before or after the arrest on Monday? Comer, on Sunday, “sniggered in his
sleeve,” and denied having anything to do with the matter.
If he wishes to prove that a defendant knew about the negroes, he proves that they have
denied having any knowledge, and
claims that such denial is enough.
If he desires to establish that they have done any act, he calls upon a
witness who has heard them deny doing it; proves such denial, and straightway
claims that he has undeniably proved that they did do it. The whole evidence produced and relied
upon , has been a burlesque upon the ordinary tests of
truth, and the demand for the application of what has been proven has been
extravagant beyond all precedent.
There is no escape for a man under these rules. If he is silent, he consents to the
charge. If he opens his mouth and
denies it, this proves that he is guilty of the very thing denied. If he confess it, that is the same. So that if a man is silent, like Johnson
or Way; or denies, like Pickering and Comer, it is all the same. They can do or say nothing but what will
prove their gilt.
The demands of the plaintiff’s counsel in this case, would never had been
made, had he not counted upon prejudice—had he not sought in the signs of the
times, for a feeling in your bosoms which would pre—dispose you to convict the
defendants. The
In the name of Justice, I protest against such an open, barefaced
prostitution of her temple. In the
name of the Constitution of our young State, I forbid such a low, groveling,
cringing, prostration, to any influence or power. I demand that this case be acted upon
and decided upon the same principles that any other case would be treated. My clients ask but fair and impartial
justice. This they do demand. This, I now, for the last time, demand
at your hands.
CONCLUDING ARGUMENT BY MR. RORER
Gentlemen of the Jury—I come
now to perform my last duty to my client in this cause. This is, as the opposite counsel have said, an important trial. It is important to the plaintiff; for it
is an inquiry as to whether he shall be compensated for the injury he has
sustained by the acts of the defendants, done in violation of all law, and in
contempt of the Constitution. It is
important to the people of
We cannot wonder then, that it has attracted considerable attention, and
that counsel have occupied so much of your time and that of the Court, in their
investigations of the law and evidence.
In what I am about to way, I shall study brevity as much as is compatible
with a due regard to the interest of my client and the high consideration,
involved.
The gentlemen have labored, among other things to show that we have not
sufficiently proven the agency of McClure and Slaughter under the act of
Congress. Is this true,
gentlemen? Have we not proven it in
various ways, supposing that we are required to prove it at all? A reward was offered for the returning
of the negroes. Will no this sustain the idea of McClure
and Slaughter being agents? Does it
not appoint any one and every one who chooses to act under it, an agent for that
is shown to have been made some half mile from Salem, where at least two of
these defendants were present and most prominent actors in what there
transpired? Was it that we should
go before a Justice and prove our agency? No! It was that we should there prove that
the negroes were slaves and
fugitives. Did not the defendants
agree that Slaughter and McClure should be permitted to take them away on proof
that the negroes were slaves,
and not on proof that they were the duly authorized agents of the
plaintiff? I feel confident that
there can be no doubt upon this part of the evidence. But when the parties had arrived at the
Meeting House, and the crowd had greatly increased, and
when they had secured the service of the two lawyers, Button and Street, they
made another demand! Slaughter was required to prove that he
was authorized, by Daggs, to recapture the
fugitives. He had no evidence ot offer, for the Justice refused
to take any judicial cognizance of the case. The negroes were permitted to go away, and were not again
seen by Slaughter. But we contend
that no specific, personal appointment of an agent was required by the law, and
expect that so the Court will instruct you. Yet, if it should be otherwise, we look
upon the circumstances shown, as sufficient to enable you to presume that they
were duly appointed agents, or that defendants are estopped from denying their agency.
The gentleman complains that I have abused the inhabitants of
The gentlemen indulged in some remarks upon what he terms my abuse of the
“dumb walls” of the “Abolition Meeting House.” I remember no abuse. I think what said was rather in its
defence.
I observed that when appropriated to the purposes of religious
worship---that purpose which is so well calculated to inspire the heart of man
with the highest and holiest of emotions---it was entitled to the respect and
reverence of all. But when desecrated by the intrusion of abolition
sentiments---when converted into the “Committee Room” of the “under-ground rail road” company, where
their schemes of robbery and wrong were deliberately concocted, I then compared it to a place which shall
be nameless. But walls are not
dumb, gentlemen; they speak to us in the boldest and most pleasing
language. The defendants’ witnesses
may be dumb---may stand mute. As it was said of old, “eyes have they but they see not, and they
have ears but they hear not” anything which you, as arbiters of justice, are
interested in knowing. But
the walls of a church are not dumb---they have their language and their
influence. Yon lonely steeple of
the House of God points from earth to Heaven, with an eloquence more powerful
than that of living tongues. The
veriest skeptic of the present day, would acknowledge
the influence and appreciate the associations, could he but look upon the humble
stone on which Jacob of old pillowed his head at night; where he saw the vision
of the ladder and the angels, and reared an altar and vowed a vow to the God of
Abraham and Isaac, when journeying into Padan-Aram. He would not say such things were dumb,
nor do I. Why were these persons
assembled in that Abolition Meeting House?
For what purpose did they go thee?
Was it out of a sincere desire to see justice done to a citizen of
We are next told that we have no evidence of an escape---that we could
have proved this fact by William Daggs and were bound
to produce him! How do they know
that he could have given better evidence of an escape, than we have already
produced? Are the gentlemen quite
certain that he saw the negroes leave his father’s? If so, that is quite enough for our
purpose. Is this at all
probable/
I think not. Those
who have such intentions do not usually advise their masters of it, nor
start off in open day. This is one
of those acts which require darkness
rather than light. The very terms
we employ in speaking of it, imply, in most cases, that it was done in
secret---without the knowledge or consent of the owner, and, consequently, that
he did not see it done, and that it
is not probable that any one, not assisting or conniving at it, did see it. We have shown that Daggs owned and possessed them a month previous, and it has
not been shown that he ever sold them, hired them, or sent them away. No doubt has been thrown upon our title
by any circumstance whatever. If we had sold the negroes, it is a fact for them to prove; and it would be the
easiest method of defeating our suit forever. That they have not attempted to do so
confirms and supports our evidence.
It is said that drowning men catch at straws, and we have proof of the
truth thereof in this case.
The people of
Plaintiff’s son has proven that plaintiff had owned the older negroes a longtime; that he resided some fifteen miles
distant from his father, who sent for him immediately after the negroes were missing; that he went up to his father’s and
found them gone, and that he had seen them there about a month before and I have
shown that the presumption is that the possession and property continue, until
something is shown to the contrary.
The gentlemen says that according to my idea the
assemblage of Abolitionists in
It is asked why McClure is not here to testify---why we have not his
deposition? The gentleman himself
tells you we made the effort but were so unfortunate as to have the deposition
ruled out. Is this to be made a
circumstance against us?
It is asked, also, if finding negroes in
The gentleman’s illustrations all fail him. Those of the Pitcher, Stove, the negro in the street, men in thick
or thin clothing, are all of a certain class, and are not fixed and
unalterable. They may be rebutted
by others of a similar character.
If we had glasses sufficiently powerful to discern the material of a
man’s dress in the moon, and should find it to be of fur, we should probably suppose it was
cold weather there. But if we
should at the same time see that the land was clothed in a luxurious garb of
verdure, the presumption would be removed, or rather the one would balance the
other, and we would be compelled to look for some other fact to give certainty
to our opinion. That black men in
As to the negroes
being the property of Daggs, the illustration of the
coin, given by the gentleman, is another failure. He has admitted the ownership of Daggs in the opening.
He cannot now deny it. Coin,
known by mere description, will not raise any presumption, perhaps. But the identity of these blacks is not
shown solely by their being so many men, women, and children, but by their age,
color, names, and conduct. Now all
men may have coin, but all men have not negroes.
If you find a certain number of coins of different descriptions which you
have lost, and find them under circumstances similar to these, there could not
be stronger proof that they are yours, and the variety in description increases
the certainty of the proof.
These defendants were inter-meddlers with the rights of plaintiff and his
agents, and the agreement made by Slaughter, was made under moral duress and
compulsion, to avoid a breach of the peace and a contention with over-powering
numbers. That he was agent, is shown by the acts of defendants in treating with
him as such. The intermeddling of
defendants is like “going to
Let us now look at the general character of the evidence. You know as men, if not as jurors, that
we have been forced against our will into this trial, and that some of the
witnesses we were compelled to call were originally defendants to this
suit. Slaughter tells you that when
he overtook the wagon, in the bushes near
We are asked what evidence there is against John Pickering. His horses went to
As to the agency of Slaughter, I still contend that the agreement with
him stops them from denying it. The
offering a reward will constitute a sufficient agency in those who act upon
it. If I publicly offer to pay any
But upon the Counts for harboring and concealing it is conceded that no
agency is necessary. The first two
Counts are for a rescue---the next two for harboring and concealing so that we
lost the negroes, and the
lst two for hindering and preventing us from regaining
the possession of them. On the
third and fourth Counts it is not required of us to prove any agency, or that
defendants even knew whose negroes they were. It is enough if they knew that they were
slaves. If any act of defendants
amounted to harboring or concealing, that moment their guilt became fixed, and
they became liable to us for the amount of damage we may have sustained. If we afterwards recovered the negroes; our damages would be for
the detention and the expense we incurred.
If the negroes were
not recovered, then their value must fix that amount. We have acknowledged the recaption of four of the nine---two women and two
children. The remaining five have
never been regained. This is the
amount of our injury. Under the
evidence we have adduced, you will have no difficulty in making the
estimate. It is shown that the men
were worth nine hundred or one thousand dollars each; the women six or seven
hundred; Martha the girl two hundred and fifty or three hundred, and William two
hundred. No value was placed upon
the other two children. What their
services were worth, a year, was also shown to you. If you find the defendants guilty, you
will assess the damages according to the evidence upon this point which has not
been controverted or disputed.
I have said that this is an important case, and I repeat it. In whatever light you choose to view
it---whether as citizens of Iowa, desirous as you should be, to convince our
sister States that you will deal out justice as impartially to them as to your
immediate neighbors---as citizens of the Union, determined to support and
sanction in all its parts, the compact to which, upon our admission, we became
parties---as neighbors to Missouri and anxious to maintain peaceful and friendly
relations with her and her citizens---as law-abiding men, acting under and by
authority of the law and the constitution---in whatever light you look upon the
case before you, it presents an important and interesting aspect. It would do so at any time---how much
more important, then, does it become at the present crisis? The very subject upon which you are called to decide, is now agitating
our country from
Gentlemen, I have done. I
commend the case to your hands with the firmest conviction that you will meet
out to us nothing more or less than impartial justice.
Upon the conclusion of Mr. Rorer’s argument, his Honor, J.J. Dyer,
proceeded to deliver to the Jury the following
CHARGE
This (said his Honor) is an action of Trespass on the Case, brought by
the plaintiff, Ruel Daggs, a
citizen of the State of
It is a case well calculated, at this time, to create some degree of
interest in this community. For,
while our whole country is agitated upon the subject of Slavery—while towns,
counties and States, have been are arrayed against each other in an almost
warlike attitude, and this great Confederacy is thus threatened with
destruction, and the fears of citizens in various portions of the Union are
exciting and inflaming their minds, and driving them to acts, which, it is
feared, will have soon, if they have not already, brought us to the very verge
of Destruction---I repeat, it is not strange there should be some interest
manifested in the result of this case.
I am happy to say that no undue excitement has been shown during the
progress of this trial. You, gentlemen, have patiently and calmly heard this case, and
thereby shown that you appreciate its importance. Counsel on both sides
have ably, zealously, but with a commendable spirit of fairness and
liberality, conducted it to its close.
With the general excitement on this subject, and the many plans for its
settlement upon some satisfactory basis, we have nothing to do. Our business now is with the laws and
Constitution as they are, and not as we may think they ought to be; and, I doubt
not, gentlemen, that you will come to the investigation of this case in your
retirement, with minds unbiased, unprejudiced, and with a sincere desire to
render your verdict in accordance with the law and evidence submitted to
you.
The act of Congress upon which this action is founded declares “that any
person who shall knowingly and willingly obstruct or hinder such claimant, his
agent or attorney, in so seizing or arresting such fugitive from labor, or shall
rescue said fugitive from such claimant, his agent or attorney when so arrested,
pursuant to the authority herein given or declared; or shall harbor or conceal
said person after notice that he or she was a fugitive from labor as aforesaid,
shall, for either of said offences, forfeit and pay the sum of five hundred
dollars, which penalty may be recovered by and for the benefit of such claimant,
by action of debt in any court proper to try the same; saving moreover to the
person claiming such labor or service his right of action for or on account of
said injuries to either of them.” (Act of
2d. That the defendants rescued the said slaves
from the custody of plaintiff’s agents:
3d. That the defendants concealed said slaves
from said agents:
4th. That the defendants harbored and
concealed said salves:
5th. That defendants obstructed and
hindered an arrest:
6th. That defendants hindered and
prevented the agents from reclaiming and seizing said
slaves.
George Daggs, plaintiff’s witness, states that
he is the son of plaintiff, and that his father has resided in Clark county,
Missouri, for twelve or thirteen years; that he, the witness, resided in
Missouri about fifteen miles from plaintiff; that soon after the 2d of June,
1848, he was sent for by his father to hunt after nine slaves belonging to
plaintiff, and upon arriving at plaintiff’s house, found that the nine slaves
were not at the house of this father, the plaintiff, viz; a black man named Samuel Pulcher, 40 or 45 years old, worth at that time from $900 to
a $1000; Walker, a yellow man 22 or 23 years old, worth from $900 to $1,000;
three negro women, Dorcas,
Mary and Julia, worth $600 each; a boy and girl worth $250 or $300 each, and two
young children, whose value he could not give. That soon after he was sent for to
plaintiff’s, the two women Dorcas and Julia, and the
children, Martha and William, were recovered and brought back to plaintiff;s house.
He knows nothing of the manner of the escape, or whether they did escape
to this State of his own knowledge.
Albert Button resided, in June, 1848, at
Jonathan Pickering resides near
Samuel Slaughter was employed by McClure, or some one, not the plaintiff,
to assist in finding the negroes; and after looking
for a day or two, as they were riding on the road from Farmington to Salem, saw
a wagon driving rapidly towards Salem, and following, overtook it about 1-4 of a
mile from Salem. There were three
young men in it and not any negroes as he expected to find. That he went into the woods a short
distance and came upon nine slaves---the description answering to those
mentioned in the declaration, he and McClure took them and tried to get them to
go with them; a part consented---he placed one of the men on a horse when
several persons came down the Salem road, two of whom he afterwards ascertained
to be Elihu and Thomas Clarkson Frazier, the
defendants. One of them said to
him, you can’t take these negroes with you, unless you prove them to be
slaves. The other said you cannot
take them in any event, whether you prove them or not. Soon after, other men came down the road
from
Hunting was in
Dorland was in his school house, and hearing a noise, dismissed his
school; went out and found considerable excitement and confusion; got upon a
pile of boards and called the attention of the company to him, and proposed that
there should be a trial., and if the negroes were
found to be fugitives from labor, they should be given up; all consented to
this; went into the meeting house; the black man and child went in also;
Slaughter was requested to show his authority as agent; stated that neither he
nor any one else was acting as agent in the sense, as the term was understood
then; one party wanted to take the negroes off, the
other wished them free. Saw Thomas
C. Frazier at the stone house; heard no threats.
Several other witnesses corroborate the testimony of the two last, and
the balance does not vary from the facts which have any bearing. This is the substance of the testimony
in the case. But it will be for
you, gentlemen, to say whether, from all the evidence, the plaintiff has made
out his case.
There is not the shadow of a doubt, that the statute gives a right of
action when its provisions have been violated. This has been settled beyond all
controversy by the decisions of our Circuit and Supreme Courts; and, indeed, it
has not been denied by defendants counsel.
Your inquiry will be, simply, whether the defendants are guilty of having
committed any or all of the acts alleged in the declaration. The fist count charges them with having
rescued, aided and assisted plaintiff’s slaves to escape. To have do e this, it must be proved
that the defendants had notice that these negroes were
fugitives from labor, and that the claimant was either the master, his agent or
attorney, and so knowing, that they willingly rescued by force or such other
means, as led to the escape of the fugitives. If there is any evidence to show that
the defendants possessed the knowledge, no matter how obtained, that the negroes owed service to the plaintiff, either by the
confession of the negroes, or by a written or verbal
notice, and that they knew at the same time, that Slaughter and McClure were the
agents of plaintiff they are guilty under this count. A mere obstruction or hindrance after
seizure, which does not afford an opportunity of escape, is not an offence
within the meaning of the statute.
If an escape should, however, happen in consequence of the obstruction or
hindrance, and this obstruction or hindrance is made for an illegal purpose, the
offence would be complete. The master, or his authorized agent, may
seize his slaves, and no one can legally oppose or hinder him, not even a
Magistrate, without a warrant, oath or probable cause, to suppose that the
salves do not owe service to such master, or that he is using more force and
violence than is necessary for their peaceable removal. The Magistrate has no authority to issue
his warrant to seize and bring before him fugitives from labor; he can only act
when they are thus brought before him; and the question for him to try, is,
whether the persons so brought before him, owe service or labor, according to
the laws of the State from which they fled, to the person claiming him, and if
so, to grant his certificate for his removal to such State; nor is it necessary
that the master or agent should have a warrant to authorize him to seize the
slave. He may take him, wherever
found. This right of the master
results from his ownership, and no one can interfere
with this right, if he is aware that it exists. That is, if he is cognizant of the fact
that the person seized is a fugitive from labor, and the person claiming him is
the master of his legally authorized agent. A knowledge of
these facts must be brought home to
him, but ignorance of the laws or an
honest belief that the person seized is not a fugitive from labor, will not
excuse an offender.
The second count alleges a rescue.
The remarks made upon the first will apply to this.
The third count for concealing, and the fourth, for harboring and
concealing, will be considered together.
These terms, Judge McLean has decided are synonymous; they have the same
meaning in the statute on which this action is founded. To harbor and conceal is to do some act
by which the fugitives from labor are prevented from being discovered by the
master, either by hiding, secreting, or transporting beyond the reach or
knowledge of the owner. It has been
very properly remarked by the same eminent Justice of the Supreme Court of the
The fifth count is for hindering an arrest. If the evidence is, that an arrest was
made by Slaughter and McClure before any of the defendants interfered, they
cannot be found guilty under this count.
The sixth count is for hindering and preventing agents from reclaiming
and seizing. You are to weight the
evidence and say whether any or all of the defendants hindered and prevented the
legal agents of plaintiff from reclaiming and seizing persons whom the
defendants knew to be the slaves of plaintiff.
To recapitulate; you must be satisfied from the evidence that the
plaintiff was the owner of the slaves in question, that they escaped from his
service in the State of Missouri, to the State of Iowa, and that the defendants
rescued, aided and assisted to escape from, or hindered the arrest of the
fugitives by the owner, his constituted agent or attorney, and that defendants
knew at the time that claimant was the owner or the agent. If the plaintiff, Ruel Daggs, in person made the
claim and it was personally known to defendants, that he was the person he
pretended to be, or if it had been proved that he was such person, then if the
evidence shows that the defendants committed any of the acts charged, then they
are guilty, or, if an agent is claimant, his authority to act as such must be
shown at the time of the rescue; either in writing, or by proper legal proof, it
must be proved that defendants knew by some other way, that they were
agents. The acknowledgement after,
by plaintiff, that Slaughter and McClure were his agents is not sufficient to
charge defendants. It was not,
could not be a violation of the law on the part of the defendants, unless this
knowledge at the particular time mentioned, is brought hom to them, and that with this knowledge they were governed
in what they did, by a desire to prevent the caption or retention of such
fugitives by the owner or his agents.
Or to enable plaintiff to succeed on the third and fourth counts, you
must be satisfied from the evidence that defendants, with a
knowledge that the negroes were fugitives from
labor, concealed and harbored them.
It is not necessary, that it should be proved that defendants knew, that the persons claiming to be agents, were such. If at any time before the institution of
this suit, defendants concealed, or kept from the knowledge of the owner, these
fugitives, with the intention of preventing a seizure or capture, then they are
guilty. It matters not, whether the
owner or his agents were in search of these slaves or not. It is sufficient that such concealing
and harboring under the circumstances mentioned, was the cause of the loss of
said slaves.
It is not necessary that I should speak of the feelings and prejudices
which exist upon the subject of slavery.
Our feelings are rarely a safe guide to govern us in the discharge of our
duty to our country and our fellow citizens. If we are guided by the laws, which are
a shield to al persons, alike, we cannot err, and no good citizen will desire to
see the rights of the citizen of any State trampled upon with impunity. Under the law of Congress in regard to
fugitives from labor, the plaintiff is justly entitled to a verdict at your
hands, if the defendants have been proved to be guilty. But nothing but such legal proof as will
satisfy your minds, that the defendants have willingly and knowingly violated
this law, will justify a verdict of guilty. The case is submitted to you. If you find the defendants or any of
them guilty, you will find the value of the services at the time of their
escape, and that value is the amount which the negroes would have sold for at that
time.
The defendants then asked the following further
instructions:
The act of Congress is the sole foundation of the right of the plaintiff
so far as this suit is concerned, and the jury cannot find for the plaintiff
unless they find from the evidence that the defendants or some of them violated
the provisions of said act;
1st. Before the
jury can find for the plaintiff on any of the counts they must find from the testimony, first, that the slaves of
the plaintiff escaped from Missouri without his consent; second, that they came
to Iowa; third, and that the same identical slaves or some of them were found in Henry
county, Iowa, and fourth, that the defendants or some of them committed a
violation of the act of Congress, by which an injury has accrued to the
plaintiff.
2d. That before the jury can
find the defendants guilty under the 3d and 4th counts, they must
decide that the defendants harbored and concealed slaves of the plaintiff, who
had escaped from Missouri, and that they, defendants, had knowledge that they
were slaves. The offence of
“harboring and concealing” is not committed by treating the fugitive on the
ordinary principles of humanity.
The defendants might reightfully converse with
him, and relieve his hunger and thirst, without violation of the law, and under
these counts might do any act, except
one which not only showed the intention of eluding the vigilance of the
master, but was calculated to attain that object.
3d. An open and fair act with an intention to
procure a fair legal hearing for the fugitives is no violation of the act of
Congress, and does not authorize a verdict against the
defendants.
4th. If the
persons who made, or attempted to make the arrest of the alleged fugitives were
not legal agents of the plaintiff Daggs, and
previously authorized by him, they must find the defendants not guilty as to the
1st 2d, 5th and 6th counts of the
declaration.
5th.
Even if the defendants ratified and adopted the acts of Slaughter
and McClure after the arrest or attempted arrest, it does not legalize the
agency or arrest so as to affect the defendants or their acts. To charge them there must be a
previously existing agency.
6th.
The plaintiff must prove that he owned slaves and resided in
Missouri.---Second, that his slaves escaped without his consent, and came to the
State of
7th.
That the plaintiff must prove facts and circumstances sufficient
to show that the escape was involuntary on his part, and the escape cannot be
presumed upon the mere hypothesis that the slaves were
property.
8th.
The plaintiff must also prove that he pursued the slaves into
All the above instructions, with the exception of the seventh, were given
by the Court.
The plaintiff then asked the following further
instructions.
1st. That the
presumption of freedom here may be rebutted by circumstances such as their
secreting themselves, and not denying their bondage, when claimed, and these
circumstances are proper evidence, if brought to knowledge of
defendants.
2d. That there need not be positive proof to
enable plaintiff to recover, but circumstantial proof is sufficient, if
satisfactory to the minds of the jury.
The first instruction, asked by plaintiff, was denied and the second
given.
His Honor having concluded his remarks upon the law and evidence, the
Jury retired in charge of an officer, and after an absence of between one and
two hours, returned into Court with a verdict, finding the defendants, Elihu Frazier, Thomas Clarkson Frazier, John Comer, Paul
Way, John Pickering, and William Johnson, guilty upon first, second, third and fourth counts of the declaration, and
assessed the damages at TWENTY-NINE
HUNDRED DOLLARS. As to the rest of the defendants, the
Jury said, not guilty.
Whereupon
defendants’ counsel moved the Court to grant a new trial on the following
grounds:
1st. Because the
Jury was improperly impanneled in violation of the
statute of Iowa, in such case made ad provided, and this fact was unknown to
defendants and their counsel, until after the rendition of the verdict;
and,
2d.
Because the verdict was against the evidence as to some of the
defendants, and upon no evidence as to others.
The motion was argued at considerable length upon these grounds with
comments upon the evidence, as applicable, under the statute, to the tenor of
the declaration, by Messrs. Hall and Morton for defendants, and opposed by Mr.
Rorer; after which the plaintiff entered a nolle prosqui as to
William Johnson; whereupon the Court decided that although the verdict was bad
upon the first, second, and third counts, it was good upon the fourth; the motion was therefore
overruled, a new trial denied, and judgment entered upon the
verdict.
Defendants then asked time to file their bill of exceptions, for the
purpose of taking the case to the Supreme Court, by Writ of error, which, no
objection being made, was
granted.
Fugitive
Slave Case
District
Court of US
For
the Southern Division of
Ruel
Daggs vs. Elihu
Frazier
Hon.
J.J. Dyer
Summary…
Printed
by Morgan & M’Kenny
6
West L.J. 555, 2 Am. Law J. (N.S.) 73, No. 3538